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Few fields of law have experienced a more dramatic pace of develop-
ment in recent years than has that of the private antitrust action.'
After several decades of relative quiescence, the action for treble
damages has grown in significance as an antitrust enforcement device
at a rapidly accelerating rate since World War 11.2 Especially since
the advent of the multitude of Electrical Industry Antitrust Cases
in 1960, such private antitrust litigation has occupied a large segment
*A.B., University of Illinois; LL.B., Harvard Law School.
tB.S. in Econ., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh
tA.B., Princeton University; LL.B., Harvard University.
1. The private action for damages caused by violation of the antitrust
laws is entirely statutory. Actions by injured individuals to recover treble dam-
ages originally were authorized by section 7 of the Sherman Act. Sherman Act,
§ 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). That provision was superseded by section 4 of the
Clayton Act in 1914. Clayton Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1963),
and for this reason it was repealed by the Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, §3, 69 Stat.
283. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, supra, provides as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
In 1955, the Clayton Act was amended to permit the Federal Government to
recover damages for injuries caused to it, but without providing for a threefold
recover. Clayton Act, § 4A, as added by the Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, §1, 69
Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. §15a (1963).
2. See, e.g., Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust,
3 ANTITRUST BULL.. 167 (Mar. - Apr., 1958); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
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of the time and effort of many judges and of many more lawyers
throughout the country. Although few have come to trial, 3 this set
of cases has already produced procedural innovations 4 and prelimi-
nary rulings which will be major factors in structuring the future
course of antitrust litigation. Perhaps of even greater importance,
however, is the fact that the mere filing and costly preparation of
more than eighteen hundred such actions has created an acute aware-
ness among the business community and the Bar of the possibilities
and the threat which the treble damage claim may represent.
A primary question raised in the ordinary private actions for dam-
ages under the antitrust laws concerns the benefit, if any, which the
plaintiffs can derive from a previous prosecution of the same defend-
ants by the Government. In enacting the Clayton Act in 1914, Con-
gress recognized the difficult problem of proof faced by private claim-
ants and sought to ease that burden by providing (in the clause which
originally was section 5 and now is section 5(a)) that judgments
entered against the defendants in Government prosecutions or injunc-
tion suits can be utilized by private parties, under certain circum-
stances, to prove the defendants' violation in subsequent actions for
treble damages. The pertinent language of that section of the Clay-
ton Act is as follows:
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter
rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or
on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to
the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be
prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action
or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said laws or by the United States under
section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply
3. At the time of the writing of this article, in March of 1965, trials have
been started and concluded in the following electrical industry antitrust cases:
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civil No. 30015, E.D.
Pa., 1964; N. W. Electric Power Cooperative v. Maloney Electric Co., Civil No.
13290-3, W.D. Mo., W. Div., 1964; City of Burlington v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., Civil No. 348-62, D. DC., 1964; San Antonio v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., Civil No. 3064, W. D. Tex., 1964. The San Antonio case was settled after
several months of trial. The other three trials proceeded to jury verdicts.
Trials in a few other cases are now in progress or are imminent. It is clear,
nevertheless, that all but a small fraction of the more than 1800 cases filed
against electrical equipment manufacturers have been or will be settled without
trials.
4. See in general, Neal and Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964).
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to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testi-
mony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in
actions under section 15a of this title. 5
It requires little imagination to realize that the outcome of a treble
damage action easily can turn upon the extent, if any, to which the
plaintiff can rely upon this provision to satisfy the burden of proof
on such difficult and expensive issues as the existence of a conspiracy
or of an intent to monopolize. It is equally obvious that the potential
availability of section 5(a) is a powerful incentive for the bringing
of such an action by any allegedly injured customer or competitor of
a firm found guilty of a violation of the antitrust laws in a criminal
prosecution.
The extent to which private litigants can utilize criminal judgments
entered on nolo contendere and guilty pleas in later actions for treble
damages is the subject of this article.6 Fundamentally this involves
the question of the status of guilty pleas and of nolo contendere pleas
under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. This subject necessarily re-
5. Clayton Act, §5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, ch. 283 §2, 69 Stat.
283, 15 U.S.C. §16 (a) (1955). As originally enacted in 1914, the provision was
designated simply as section 5 and read as follows:
That a final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any criminal
prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on
behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that
a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, This section shall not apply to consent judg-
ments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken: Provided
further, This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
rendered in criminal proceedings or suits in equity, now pending, in
which the taking of testimony has been commenced but has not been
concluded, provided such judgments or decrees are rendered before any
further testimony is taken.
The 1955 amendment involved no material change. It was occasioned only by a
desire to insert an unrelated provision (now section 5 (b)) in the statute. The
second proviso of the original section 5 was deleted by the 1955 amendment, since
it had been a temporary qualification. Some other changes in wording were made
at that time, but none of them are material to the problem of statutory construc-
tion discussed in this article. For purposes of convenience the original section 5
and the amended version will hereinafter be referred to a section 5(a) without
further distinction.
6. Although this discussion relates specifically to the use of criminal pleas,
it should be borne in mind that judgments entered in favor of the Government in
civil injunction suits brought under section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
supra, 15 U.S.C. §25, also may be available under section 5(a), to provide prima
facie evidence of the defendants' guilt.
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quires a consideration of questions such as (1) the propriety of re-
ferring to the criminal proceedings in the subsequent civil complaints
and (2) the admissibility and evidentiary value of such pleas, and of
the judgments and indictments relating thereto, in the course of the
treble damage trials.
The discussion in Part II of this article is focused upon the question
of whether judgments entered upon nolo contendere and guilty pleas
are within the scope of section 5 (a) or are excluded therefrom by the
proviso referring to consent judgments entered before the taking of
any evidence. It traces the development of the basic case law in this
area under which the courts have excluded the nolo contendere plea
from the operation of section 5 (a) for many years, but recently have
held guilty pleas to be within its scope. Because of the procedural
context in which this basic question ordinarily has been posed, Part H
includes a consideration of how the courts have ruled upon motions
to strike references to prior Government proceedings from treble
damage complaints.
Part M of this article is a brief outline and evaluation of argu-
ments which have been advanced for and against the proposition that
judgments entered on criminal pleas in general, and guilty pleas in
particular, are within the scope of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act.
Those policy matters may well be re-argued in future cases, although
the course of recent decisions probably has settled the law in favor of
the plaintiffs with regard to guilty pleas. In any event, the underly-
ing contentions undoubtedly will influence the manner in which the
courts actually permit guilty pleas, and their related judgments and
indictments, to be utilized in future civil actions.
Part IV is devoted to the evidentiary scope and effects of section
5(a) in those instances in which it is available to the plaintiff. The
discussion therein is focused principally upon the few recent Electri-
cal Industry Antitrust Cases in which the courts, for the first time,
have had to deal with questions concerning the practical utility in
treble damage trials of judgments entered against the defendants on
guilty pleas in preceding criminal actions.
II. STATE OF THE LAW
Although many important questions remain open, the basic issue of
the status of nolo contendere and guilty pleas under section 5(a) of
the Clayton Act is now rather well established. A judgment entered
on a nolo contendere plea unquestionably is excluded by the proviso
[Vol. 3: p. 167'
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from the scope of section 5(a).7 The status of a judgment entered
on a guilty plea is less certain, but the courts in the future probably
will feel compelled to follow the recent decisions of the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that such
judgments are within the scope of section 5 (a). 8
With respect to nolo pleas, the only significant issue now likely to
be raised in the ordinary treble damage case is whether any refer-
ence to the prior Government proceedings can be included in the
complaint for a collateral purpose, such as the avoidance of a statute
of limitations defense. In analyzing the status of guilty pleas, how-
ever, it is necessary also to consider the common law principles con-
cerning the effects of such pleas as admissions, and it remains perti-
nent to consider whether Congress intended section 5(a) to apply.
7. City of Burbank v. General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825, 830-35 (9th
Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company, 323 F.2d 412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964);
Illinois v. Sperry Rand Corp., 237 F. Supp. 520, (N.D. Ill., 1965); Atlantic City
Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F. Supp. 620, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. General Electric Company, 30
F.R.D. 557 (W.D.Mo. 1961); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 308 F.2d
856 (3rd Cir. 1961); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 3 F.R.D. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Barnsdall Refining
Corporation v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 310-12 (E.D. Wisc. 1940);
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd on other
issues, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), Cert. denied 314 U.S. 664 (1941). Cf., e.g.,
Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Air Reduction Company, Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (Civil consent decree struck); Ulrick v. Ethyl
Gasoline Corporation, 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (involving consent decree
entered on stipulated facts). See also, e.g., General Electric Co. v. San Antonio, 334
F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) (inadmissibility of nolo contendere pleas not challenged
on appeal); Olympic Refining Company v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264-66 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied ........ U.S ......... (1964). See discussion in Part HA, infra.
8. General Electric Co. v. San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1964);
City of Burbank v. General Electric Co. 329 F.2d 825, 834-36 (9th Cir. 1964);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers, 323 F.2d 412, 415-417 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964). Other reported decisions directly so hold-
ing are Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F. Supp.
620, 624-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Westing-
house Electric Corporation, 1962 CCH Trade Cases, Para. 70,552 (N.D. Calif.
1962). Cf. Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Air Reduction Company,
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 505, 506-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (Guilty plea in contempt proceed-
ing for violation of antitrust law consent decree held admissible). See also
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1961 CCH Trade Cases, Para. 70,143
(E.D. Pa. 1961) (Defendant did not move to strike guilty pleas). Contra N.W.
Electrical Power Cooperative, Inc. v. General Electric Company, 30 F.R.D. 557
(W.D. Mo. 1961) (References to proceedings in which defendants had entered
guilty pleas struck); Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Anti-
trust Treble Damages Actions, 71 YALE L.J. 684 (1962). See discussion in Part
IIB below.
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A. Inadmissibility of Nolo Contendere Pleas
The state of the law with regard to nolo contendere pleas can be sum-
marized with confidence: Such pleas, and the criminal indictments
and judgments relating to them, cannot properly provide any assist-
ance whatever to a private claimant in attempting to establish any
element of his cause of action. 9 The courts consistently have held for
more than three decades that judgments entered on nolo contendere
pleas are excluded entirely from the scope of section 5 (a) because
they are ".... consent judgments ... entered before any testimony has
been taken. . .", within the meaning of the proviso to that section.
The procedural context in which the section 5(a) issue has been
raised with regard to nolo contendere pleas, in the pertinent cases,
has been a motion by the defendants to strike from the complaint
various references to the prior criminal proceeding in which the
nolo plea has been entered. Despite the liberal approach ordinarily
followed by the federal courts on matters of pleading, and despite the
fact that section 5 (a) says nothing directly concerning this question,
the courts generally have granted the defendant's motion to strike
from the complaint all reference to the Government proceedings.
Similarly, a nolo contendere plea is inadmissible under ordinary rules
of evidence. 10
The law concerning the effect of nolo contendere pleas was settled
long before the recent Electrical Cases arose. The leading case in
point is Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., I one of the many private
antitrust actions against major oil refining companies which followed
in the wake of the Government's prosecutions in the so-called "Madi-
son Oil Cases". Decided in 1942, it was the first reported decision in
which the section 5 (a) proviso was held to be applicable to criminal
proceedings as well as to consent decrees in Government injunction
suits. In a persuasive analysis, District Judge Nordbye concluded
that judgments entered in Government criminal proceedings on nolo
contendere pleas are "consent judgments" entered before the taking
of testimony within the meaning of the proviso of section 5 (a) of the
Clayton Act.12 Without further discussion, the court also concluded
that references to such criminal proceedings were entirely inadmis-
sible in the subsequent private action and could not be included in
the plaintiff's complaint.
9. Supra note 7. With regard to the possible use thereof for collateral
purposes see pp. 176-177 infra.
10. E.g., United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp.
157 at 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum).
11. 26 F. Supp. 366 (R. Minn. 1939), affirmed on other issues 119 F.2d 747
(8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 664 (1941).
12. Id. at 370-79.
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Subsequent cases uniformly have followed the Twin Ports decision
with respect to the status of nolo contendere pleas under section 5
(a) of the Clayton Act. Most of them also have followed the lead of
Judge Nordbye in declaring that all references to such Government
prosecutions are inadmissible in the treble damage actions and are
subject to a motion to strike. In Barnsdall Refining Corporation v.
Birnamwood Oil Co.,1 3 for example, the court granted a motion to
pleas from a counterclaim in which allegedly an injured purchaser had
strike averments concerning a judgment entered on nolo contendere
demanded treble damages. In addition to holding that the nolo con-
tendere pleas and judgment were within the exclusionary proviso in
section 5 (a), the court concluded that they must be struck from the
the pleadings and said "If the judgments referred to would not be
admissible in evidence at the trial of this action, then it should not be
pleaded. A motion to strike is a proper method of raising the ques-
tion." 1 4
It is noteworthy that the nolo pleas involved in the Barnsdall case
had been entered before a second trial, after the defendants had ob-
tained the reversal of a prior conviction based on a jury verdict. Al-
though the court might well have concluded that the nolo plea had
not been entered before the taking of any testimony, since there had
been testimony in the first trial, it elected instead to take the more
technical view that the granting of a new trial required the criminal
proceeding to be treated as if it had never before been tried. 15
In another relatively early case, Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,'6 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted the defendant's mo-
tion to strike all references to a prior consent decree and to a judg-
ment of guilty entered upon a nolo contendere plea. The court held
that such allegations were improper because they were "unnecessary"
and prejudicial. District Judge Conger there stated (1) that the
averments concerning the consent decree and nolo plea could not be
justified on the ground that they provided background information,
because the circumstances could be introduced in evidence without
being averred in the complaint if they were relevant for such purpose,
and (2) that the allegations could not be justified on the ground that
13. 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wisc. 1940).
14. Id. at 310.
15. Id. at 311.
16. 3 F.R.D. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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they were needed to avoid the statute of limitations defense, because
the plaintiff had no obligation to anticipate that defense. 17
The decisions in the recent Electrical Cases have followed this con-
sistent line of authority regarding nolo pleas. In every instance the
courts have held that section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act does not apply
to judgments entered on nolo contendere pleas. As a general rule, the
Electrical Cases also have more firmly established the corollary prin-
ciples that no reference to Government proceedings in which nolo
contendere pleas have been entered can be included in a treble damage
complaint or admitted in evidence.
The earliest reported ruling in the Electrical Cases was an informal
opinion in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,'8 in
which Senior Judge Kirkpatrick granted motions of the defendants
to strike all portions of the treble damage complaint referring to the
nolo contendere pleas. In addition to saying that he felt bound to
grant the motions on the authority of the Twin Ports case and similar
decisions, he observed: 'The allegations objected to certainly can't be
called impertinent or scandalous, but I think they must be called im-
material, and I can see possibilities of prejudice."' 9
A case in which various facets of the present problem were dis-
cussed in some detail was Atlantic City Electric Company v. General
Electric Company. 2 0 In that case, District Judge Feinberg granted
the defendants' motions to strike from the complaints all references
to indictments to which all of the defendants had pleaded nolo con-
tendere, and to the judgments and pleas relating thereto. In doing
so, he said that the inapplicability of section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act
to the nolo contendere plea was a matter of "overwhelming authority",
and he observed that the plaintiffs had not been able to cite any treble
damage case in which a motion to strike references to such pleas
had been denied. 2 1 Judge Feinberg apparently had some doubt in his
own mind as to whether the inapplicability of section 5 (a) to a nolo
contendere plea should necessitate the granting of a motion to strike,
but he concluded that the consistent line of precedents left no leeway
17. Ibid. The Court did say, however, that it would grant leave for the
plaintiffs to amend that complaint to allege simply that the running of the statute
of limitations had been suspended for a certain period because of the pendency of
government proceedings. With regard to the question of whether a plaintiff can
circumvent the rule excluding references to nolo pleas by allegations concerning
the tolling of the statute of limitations, see the discussion at pp. 176-177 infra.
18. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1961 C.C.H. Trade
Cases, Para. 7143 at p. 78,553 (transcript of oral opinion) (E.D. Pa. 1961).
19. Id. at p. 78,555.
20. 207 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
21. Id. at 628-29.
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for any other ruling. 2 2 With respect to the averments concerning the
content of the particular indictments to which nolo pleas had been
entered, he granted the motions to strike on the ground that the
issue thus raised was "inextricably linked" with the question raised
by the motion to strike the nolo pleas and the judgments thereon. 2 3
In all other cases in which the question has been considered, in the
Electrical Industry Litigation and elsewhere, the courts have held
that nolo contendere pleas are excluded from section 5(a) as "con-
sent judgments" within the meaning of the proviso, that such pleas
are themselves not admissible in evidence for any purpose, and that
other references to the prior Government proceedings in which nozo
contendere pleas were accepted ordinarily should be struck from the
treble damage complaint and excluded from evidence because they are
either evidentiary in nature or irrelevant and prejudicial. 2 4
Because of the definite inapplicability of section 5 of the Clayton
Act to judgments entered on nolo contendere pleas, the Justice De-
partment has endeavored for several years to prevent defendants ac-
cused of so-called "hard-core" antitrust violations from avoiding the
affects of section 5(a) by entering nolo pleas in the Government's
criminal prosecutions. In some instances, including the Electrical
Cases, the Justice Department has demanded that the defendants
enter guilty pleas, at least to the principal indictments, as the price
of avoiding criminal trials.2 5 In other instances, the Government
lawyers have succeeded in inserting in consent decrees language de-
signed to prevent the defendants from contesting the basic issues of
liability in subsequent actions for damages. 2 6
Whether the Government can avoid the Twin Ports principle for
the benefit of potential private plaintiffs by following such a strategy
remains uncertain. In some instances, the courts have rejected the
view that the Justice Department has any business attempting to
assist private claimants in such a manner and have accepted the nozo
22. Id. at 628-30.
23. Id. at 629.
24. Bupra note 7.
25. See transcript of argument in United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., Crim. No. 20235, and related cases, E.D. Pa., March 24, 1960, 1960 CCH
Trade Cases, Para. 69,699. In that instance, however, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Robert A. Bicks expressly denied that the purpose of the Justice Depart-
ment's opposition to the entry of nolo contendere pleas was to assist potential
plaintiffs in subsequent treble damage actions.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Lake Asphalt and Petroleum Co., 1960 CCH
Trade Cases, Para. 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v. Standard Ultramarine
& Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 684 n. 5
(1962).
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contendere pleas (or entered proposed consent decrees) over the
Government's objections. 27 Furthermore, the court in a subsequent
treble damage action might well treat such a criminal case as if it had
involved a simple and unqualified consent judgment. Thus, in Ulrich
v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation,2 8 a district court held that a consent
decree which had been entered upon stipulated facts agreed upon
solely for the purpose of the Government case was inadmissible in a
treble damage action. A significant decision in this regard was made
in January of this year in Illinois v. Sperry Rand Corp.,2 9 where Dis-
trict Judge Hubert L. Will granted a motion to strike from a treble
damage complaint all references to a prior criminal case in which the
defendants had entered nolo contendere pleas coupled with express
consents to the entry of guilty findings.
The principal question yet to be decided concerning the value of
nolo contendere pleas in private antitrust actions is the extent to
which references to such Government proceedings may be averred in
the complaint or admitted in evidence for a collateral purpose, even
though they are clearly inadmissible for purposes of establishing the
defendants' guilt. In Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 3 0 for example,
Circuit Judge Learned Hand held that a plaintiff was entitled to in-
troduce in evidence a prior criminal indictment and a plea of nolo
contendere thereto for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of
an individual defendant who had elected to testify in the subsequent
civil case. A more important aspect of this question is whether the
plaintiff should be permitted to make references in the complaint to
the Government prosecutions for the purpose of showing that the
statute of limitations had been tolled. 3 1 In the Atlantic City Electric
Company case, 3 2 Judge Feinberg denied motions to strike from the
complaint references to civil injunction suits brought by the Govern-
27. See note 56 and 57, infra.
28. 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
29. 237 F. Supp. 520, (N.D. Ill. 1965).
30. 162 F.2d 779, 784-85 (2nd Cir. 1947). However, the plaintiff in that
action had not even asserted a right to utilitze the criminal judgment as evidence
of an antitrust law violation, under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and Judge
Hand observed that the nolo plea clearly was Inadmissible for the purpose of prov-
ing the operative facts in any other case.
31. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act, supra, as added by the Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, §2, c. 9 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. §16(b) (1963), provides that the running
of the four year statute of limitations therein established for treble damages acts
shall be tolled during the pendency of any criminal or civil proceedings of the
government against the defendant on the basis of some allegedly unlawful con-
duct.
32. Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F.
Supp. 620, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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ment in connection with the Electrical Industry indictments, on the
ground that the avernments were material to the defendants' antici-
pated statute of limitations defense. In the Alden-Rochelle, Inc.
case, 3 3 however, a district court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that they should be permitted to allege and show that a criminal
judgment had been entered against the defendants on nolo contendere
pleas for that purported purpose, although the court did grant leave
for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege simply that the
running of the statute of limitations had been suspended during a
certain period by the pendency of a proceeding instituted by the Gov-
ernment. As a matter of fairness and of sound judicial policy, the
courts certainly should be wary about permitting plaintiffs to refer
to criminal prosecutions under the guise of such collateral purposes.
If the fact that a judgment has been entered against the defendants
in a Government prosecution is made known to the jury, it is bound
to have a prejudicial effect far out of proportion to any proper pur-
pose for which ostensibly they have been offered by the plaintiffs.
B. Admissibility of Guilty Pleas
The status of guilty pleas under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
has involved much more uncertainty and dispute than has that of
nolo contendere pleas. Despite their many similarities, nolo and
guilty pleas have been treated quite differently in regard to section
5 (a). Whereas the courts long and consistently have held that judg-
ments entered on nolo contendere pleas are beyond the scope of
section 5(a), no court squarely faced that question with respect to
guilty pleas until the Electrical Cases. Different rulings have been
handed down by different judges in those cases, but the decisions
of the Courts of Appeals for three circuits in 1963 and 1964 probably
have established, beyond serious challenge, the proposition that judg-
ments entered on guilty pleas do furnish a prmia facie case for
plaintiffs in subsequent civil actions on certain of the issues they
must establish.
Until quite recently there was good reason to expect the courts to
treat guilty pleas as consent judgments under the proviso to section
5(a). The language of such early landmark decisions as the Twin
33. Alden-Rochelle v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers, 3 F.R.D. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). A similar intermediate position on this
question was stated as dicta by Judge Halbert in Sacramento Municipal Utility
District v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1962 CCH Trade Cases, Para.
70,552 at p. 77,224 (N.D. Calif. 1962), and by Senior Judge Kirkpatrick in Phila-
delphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 205 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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Ports case 34. and the Barnsdall35 case rather clearly indicates that
those courts which excluded nolo pleas from the scope of section
5(a) also viewed guilty pleas as beyond the scope of that section.
In one of the early rulings in the Electrical Industry Litigation, the
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, without discus-
sion, granted a motion to strike references to the criminal proceedings
in which guilty pleas had been entered. 3 6 Even in the three cases
in which the Courts of Appeals ultimately ruled to the contrary,
some notable members of the judiciary issued opinions stating that
section 5(a) has no proper application to judgments entered on
guilty pleas. 37
Nevertheless, three appellate court decisions have been handed
down on this point in the Electrical Cases, and all three have held
that guilty pleas are not consent judgments within the meaning of
the section 5 (a) proviso and, therefore, that they do furnish potential
plaintiffs the benefit of a prima facie case under the terms of that
section. The first of those precedents was a two to one decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on September 12, 1963,
in Comonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company.3 8 The second decision was handed down in the Ninth
Circuit on March 20, 1964, in City of Burbank v. General Electric
Company.39 The most recent of the three is General Electric Corn-
34. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 370-76 (D. Minn.
1939), affirmed on other issues 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert denied 314 U.S.
644 (1941).
35. Barnsdall Refining Corporation v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308,
311-12 (E.D. Wisc. 1940).
36. N. W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. General Electric Company,
30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
37 A particularly persuasive, though ultimately rejected, analysis of the
issue was set forth in Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Man-
ufacturing Company, 211 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill. 1962), reversed 323 F.2d 412
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964) by District Judge Edwin A.
Robson, one of the most active of the judicial leaders in the development of the
electrical industry litigation. A similar discussion is contained in the opinion of
District Judge Byrne in Department of Water and Power of the City of Los
Angeles v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 32 F.R.D. 204 (S.D. Calif.
1963), reversed sub nom City of Burbank v. General Electric Company, 329
F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964). See also the opinion of District Judge Connally, con-
curring specially in General Electric Company v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d
480, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1964); and the opinion of Circuit Judge Knoch dissenting
in the Commonwealth Edison case, 323 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1963). See also
Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage
Actions, 71 YALE L. J. 684, 686 (1962).
38. 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
39. 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).
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pany v. San Antonio, in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded as follows:
We agree with the conclusions reached by the 7th and 9th
Circuits. The exclusionary proviso of Section 5 (a) does not
apply to judgments entered on pleas of guilty by defendants
in criminal anti-trust actions, and judgments entered on such
pleas constitute prima facie evidence of the violation of the
anti-trust laws.4 0
It is interesting to note that all three of these appellate decisions
reversed district court rulings which had granted motions by the
defendants to strike from the complaints the plaintiffs' references
to the prior criminal proceedings. 4 1 There have been other district
court decisions in the Electrical Cases, however, which are consistent
with the law as now established by the 5th, 7th and 9th Circuit Courts
of Appeals. 4 2
Despite the facts that the Supreme Court never has ruled on the
question and that some highly respected judges have reached con-
trary conclusion, it seems likely now that the admissibility of judg-
ments based on guilty pleas under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
is an established principle of law. Even those judges who might
otherwise have reached a contrary conclusion probably will feel com-
pelled now to follow the lead of the three Courts of Appeals which
squarely have decided that guilty pleas are within the scope of
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. 4 3
Even without the aid of section 5(a), guilty pleas entered in the
Government antitrust prosecution probably would be admissible
under ordinary rules of evidence in any later action against the same
defendants. Whereas a nolo contendere plea by its very nature is
limited in effect to the specific proceeding in which it is entered, a
40. 334 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
41. See note 37, supra. The lower court ruling involved in the City of San
Antonio decision in the Fifth Circuit was unreported.
42. Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F.
Supp. 620, 624-28, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Note, however, that Judge Feinberg
at p. 627 actually reserved final decision on the status of guilty pleas to the
trial judge); Sacramento Public Utility District v. Westinghouse Electric Corpo-
ration, 1962 CCH Trade Cases, Para. 70,552 (N.D. Calif. 1962). See also City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1961 CCH Trade Cases, Para.
70,143 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (in which the defendants had moved to strike nobo pleas
but not guilty pleas).
43. This was the reason for which District Judge Conally concurred in the
result, rather than dissenting, in General Electric Company v. City of San
Antonio, 334 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
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guilty plea traditionally has constituted an admission against interest
which could be used against the defendant in other actions. 4 4 Con-
sequently, the practical significance of the applicability of section
5(a) in cases involving guilty pleas necessarily will depend upon
the extent, if any, to which section 5 (a) may be held to confer upon
the plaintiffs evidentiary benefits not available under ordinary rules
of evidence.
One final issue concerning the status of guilty pleas must be con-
sidered: Even assuming that guilty pleas and related documents are
deemed to be admissible in evidence and to be entitled to prima facie
effect, should they nevertheless be struck from treble damage
complaints. Although the cases previously cited in this section
involved the denial of motions to strike, there is some authority
on which defendants will be able to rely in contending that at least
some of those references should be struck. In Federal Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corporation, for example, the District Court
for the District of Massachusetts granted motions to strike from a
treble damage complaint certain detailed allegations concerning a
previous Government injunction suit in which the defendant had
been found guilty of antitrust law violations. The holding of that
case was stated as follows:
Under § 5 of the Clayton Act, 15 USCA § 16, some or all of
this material may be admissible at trial as prima facie evi-
dence of violation of the antitrust laws by the defendant.
Its inclusion in the complaint is, however, improper as a
detailed pleading of evidentiary matter. Most of the cases
dealing with this problem have, however, allowed plaintiffs
to include in the complaint a simple allegation of the entry
of the decree and plaintiffs' intention to rely on it. 4 5 (Em-
phasis added)
So long as the plaintiff's complaint alleges the necessary elements
of a cause of action for treble damages, there is certainly no need
for it to allege the existence of the previous conviction or any other
44. See discussion of this point in Part IV, infra, and cases cited in note
98, infra.
45. 19 F.R.D. 209, 210 (D. Mass. 1956). See also Department of Water
and Power of the City of Los Angeles v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company,
32 F.R.D. 204, 208 (S.D. Calif. 1963), reversed sub nor City of Burbank v.
General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964) where the argument
was stated by the district court in Allis-Chalmers in the following language at
p. 208 (which was not considered by the Court of Appeals which reversed the
granting of a motion to strike):
Section 5(a) states a rule of evidence. . . and only ultimate facts
should be pleaded.
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evidence which the plaintiff intends ultimately to introduce to estab-
lish those elements. Despite the liberality of pleading rules in the
federal courts, at least some courts might well be persuaded in future
cases that references in the complaint to criminal prosecutions in
which guilty pleas have been entered are evidentiary in character
and should not be permitted, especially in view of their potentially
prejudicial effect. Whether this issue has any practical significance
in any treble damage case, of course, will depend upon the use to
which the complaint is put in the trial, and particularly upon whether
it is made available to the jury.4 6
III. POLICIES AND ARGUMENTS
Because the status of nolo contendere and of guilty pleas under
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act is rather well settled by existing
decisions, a detailed discussion of the arguments for and against
the applicability of that section would have little value at this time.
Nevertheless, an abbreviated summary and evaluation of the con-
tentions might be worthwhile, for the reasons (1) that they are
intrinsically interesting, (2) that defendants no doubt will continue
to raise the issue with respect to guilty pleas in actions for treble
damages in those circuits in which decisions have not yet been ren-
dered, and (3) that the evaluation of such considerations by the
courts surely will influence the practical application of section 5 (a)
in those future trials in which it is held to be available.
A. Arguments Advanced
The basic problem has been that section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
embodies two essentially contradictory policy objectives. The pri-
mary purpose of the operative portion of that section is to encourage
the fling of treble damage complaints by helping allegedly injured
parties to carry their burden of proof. On the other hand, the aim
of the proviso is to avoid the cost and expense of unnecessary criminal
trials by giving antitrust law defendants an incentive to capitulate.
Thus, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed in the
opinion in City of Burbank v. General Electric Company: "The real
nub of the controversy is to be found in the delicate task of balancing
the policy involved in antitrust enforcement." 4 7
Courts which have been inclined to apply section 5 to judgments
entered on criminal pleas generally have emphasized the policy of
46. See discussion of this point (and of the related issue of what may be
in evidence where section 5(a) is applicable) in Part IV, infra.
47. 329 F.2d 825, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1964).
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encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws. In Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., it was stated
as follows:
There is the congressional purpose in enacting §5(a) ...
The objective was to provide more effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws. . . .By giving those litigants the prima
facie benefit of judgments obtained by the Government,
Congress intended to save those private litigants great time
and expense. And there is evidence that the section has had
the effect of encouraging private treble damages actions. 48
Similarly, in the City of Burbank decision, it was said:
Thus, undoubtedly one purpose underlying the amendment
adopted by Congress was to make it easier for private anti-
trust plaintiffs to recover from defendants already sued and
found guilty by the government of antitrust violations. 4 9
As the above-quoted language implies, a desire to see alleged victims
of such violations recover recompense and the desire to add to the
punishment of the defendants have been influential factors in the
thinking of these courts. 5 0
Other authorities have emphasized the objective of encouraging
capitulation as embodied in the proviso. In the Twin Ports case the
court held that the term "consent judgment" in the proviso referred
to criminal judgments as well as to civil consent decrees, saying:
Reason and common sense suggest that, if Congress intended
to avoid long civil proceedings by encouraging consent de-
crees, the same consideration would apply to criminal pro-
ceedings. Congress was not obliged to make the way .easier
for private litigants. The prima facie feature of judgments
and decrees entered in proceedings instituted by the Govern-
ment was an innovation of the Clayton Act, and in consider-
ing the past experience with reference to the advantage
of consent decrees and pleas of guilty, it was apparently
assumed that the provisos would redound to the public
good.51
48. 323 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1963).
49. Supra note 47 at 831.
50. See also, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S.
558, 567-68 (1951) (dictum); Olympic Refining Company v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260,
264 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied . U.S ......... (1964) (referring to this objective
of section 5(-a)- as a reason for-holding that the plaintiff is entitled access to
documents furnished by the defendant to the Government in the prior criminal
proceeding even though a nolo plea had been entered).
51. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 372 (D. Minn. 1939).
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Later in that opinion the court stated its conclusion and resolved
the conflict of policies in the following words:
In effect, Congress said to the law violator, 'It is to your
advantage to capitulate to our demands before any testimony
is taken in any equity or criminal proceedings. If you fail,
and a decree or judgment is entered against you, such decree
or judgment will constitute prima facie proof to any or all
private litigants who may have been injured by your unfair
practices.' That the expediency of the plan appealed to Con-
gress, and that it intended by the provisos to encourage
consent judgments in criminal cases, as well as in equity
proceedings, can scarcely be gainsaid in view of the con-
gressional record.5 2
In his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Company, Circuit Judge Knock emphasized
this aspect of the dual purposes of the section:
My study of it [the legislative history] leads me to the con-
clusion that a primary Congressional purpose was to induce
capitulation of defendants to avoid protracted litigation and
to impose additional burdens by way of simplifying individ-
ual civil suits only against those who exposed the govern-
ment to extended and expensive unnecessary trials. 5 3
Although District Judge Connally felt compelled by the authority of
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions on the point to concur in the
result in General Electric Company v. San Antonio, he indicated that
he would have voted otherwise if he had been faced with the issue
as a matter of first impression, and he warned that the course of the
law concerning guilty pleas might well undermine the purpose of
the proviso:
A defendant, his nolo plea denied, will, I suggest, be inclined
to take his chances with the jury and try for an acquittal,
a not infrequent result, irrespective of the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. The purpose of the statute was to encour-
age a defendant who in fact was guilty to capitulate to the
Government, and thus to avoid the delay and expense of
the protracted proceeding. 5 4
Similarly, Judge Robson concluded in the Commonwealth Edison
case at the district court level:
52. Id. at 376.
53 323 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
54. 334 F.2d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 1964).
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The prime purpose of the statute was, as indicated, to induce
capitulation of defendants to government civil and criminal
charges. . . , and that purpose is served equally by pleas
of guilty and pleas of nolo contendere. 5 5
Thus, the judicial viewpoint manifested in these opinions, in es-
sence, is that the policy of promoting capitulation is paramount to
that of assisting private litigants. Other courts have expressed
similar sentiments in rejecting objections of the Justice Department
to the entry of nolo contendere pleas 5 6 and consent decrees.5 7
Closely related to the fundamental policy arguments have been
the opposing contentions based upon the legislative history of the
Clayton Act. In this respect the courts favoring the application of
section 5 to judgments entered on guilty pleas ordinarily have argued
that the legislative history is "inconclusive", rather than that it
provides affirmative support for that position. 58  Those taking the
contrary view, however, have emphasized the language of congres-
sional debates.
55. Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Com-
pany, 211 F. Supp. 712, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
56. United States v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 20 F.R.D. 451, 456 (N.D.
Tex. 1957), where the court said:
It is fundamental that the primary responsibility of the Government
in a criminal case involves the consideration of public interests, not
private interests.
See also: United States v. Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc., 1959 CCH
Trade Cases, Para; 69,435 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
1957 CCH Trade Cases, Para. 68,173 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Cigarette
Merchandisers Association, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States
v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Calif. 1954).
57. United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company, 203 F. Supp.
657 (E.D. Wisc. 1962). The Supreme Court has held that the courts should not
enter consent decrees over Government objections as to the substantive terms
of relief in United States v. Ward Baking Company, 376 U.S. 327 (1964), but
its opinion in that case furnishes.no support for an argument that the Justice
Department should be permitted to insist upon the entry of guilty pleas or
express admission of liability to potential plaintiffs as a condition to the avoid-
ance of a Government trial.
58. Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F.
Supp. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). (Only one actual reference to the debates was
as cited by Judge Feinberg). See Also City of Burbank v. General Electric
Company, 329 F.2d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Company
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 323 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
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One of the most thorough discussions of the legislative history
is contained in the Twin Ports opinion. 59 As District Judge Nordbye
explained in that case, the original version of the bill as introduced in
and adopted by the House contained a provision making Government
civil decrees conclusive evidence in subsequent treble damage actions,
and the Senate amended it by committee action and on the floor to
make both civil and criminal judgments admissible as prima facie
evidence.6 0 The proviso making sections 5(a) applicable to consent
judgments thereafter was added in Conference for the purpose of
encouraging capitulation. 6 1 This sequence of events itself indicates
that the proviso was intended to cover criminal pleas as well as civil
consent decrees. Moreover, the language of the floor debates provides
evidence of specific understanding that it would apply to guilty pleas
as well as to nolo contendere pleas. One of several such statements
is the following explicit statement by Senator Reed, a member of the
Conference Committee which inserted the proviso:
It is my opinion, from that language, that the deduction
must be drawn that the exception applies to criminal as well
as civil consents. The only way you can consent in a criminal
case is by an absolute plea of guilty or the plea of nolo
contendere. 62
Similarly, the courts have fashioned arguments for and against
the application of section 5(a) to nolo and guilty pleas from the
language of the statute. As Judge Feinberg observed in the Atlantic
City case, the language of section 5(a) permits the making of
diametrically opposed contentions. 6 3 The argument in favor of the
application of the section to criminal pleas was that the term "consent
judgment" implied a reference to "consent decrees" as entered in
civil injunction suits. The above-cited legislative history persuasively
answered that contention in the view of the District Court for the
District of Minnesota in the Twin Ports case. 6 4 Moreover, as origi-
59. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 373-75 (D. Minn.
1939). Another extensive discussion of the legislative history is found in Judge
Robson's opinion in the Commonwealth Edison case, Commonwealth Edison
Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 211 F. Supp. 712, 728
(N.D. Ill. 1962).
60. See Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 374 (D. Minn.
1939).
61. See also U.S. 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. No. 585, 4.
62. 51 Cong. Rec. 15823 (1914). This statement and other pertinent excerpts
from the debate are quoted in the Twin Ports opinion.
63. Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207 F.
Supp. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
64. Supra note 60 at 373-75.
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nally enacted, section 5(a) contained a second proviso, which ex-
pressly employed the term "consent judgments" in referring to the
results of certain criminal actions pending before the courts on the
effective date of the Clayton Act. 6 5
Under another frequently found type of argument, some courts
have endeavored to determine whether the noo contendere or guilty
pleas involve elements of "consent". The opinions of courts favoring
the application of section 5(a) to guilty pleas have purported to
distinguish between the two pleas by asserting that the nolo con-
tendere plea requires the consent of the Justice Department or the
consent of the court under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedures, whereas a defendant is entitled to plead guilty as of
right.6 6 Such an attitude was stated tersely and unpersuasively in
Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation where the court said, ". . . a plea of guilty cannot be
construed as being a consent decree, any more than a crime can be
consented to."' 67 Even the court which decided the Twin Ports case
-and which clearly was of the opinion that both of these criminal
pleas should be excluded by the proviso - distinguished between
nolo and guilty pleas in this regard.68 Other courts have found no
real difficulty in construing the words "consent judgment" as suffi-
ciently broad to cover judgments entered on guilty pleas however.
In Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, for example, Judge Byrne
interpreted this term by referring to the balance of the proviso:
The reasons for regarding judgments rendered on pleas of
nolo contendere in criminal proceedings as within the proviso
are that such judgments are entered before testimony in a
trial on the merits is taken, signify capitulation, and there-
65. See City of Burbank v. General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825, 831
(9th Cir. 1964); Barnsdall Refining Corporation v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F.
Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Wisc. 1940). See also opinion of Judge Robson in Common-
wealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 211 F. Supp.
712, 728 (N.D. fl1. 1962).
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Company, 323 F.2d 412, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 939
(1964); City of Burbank v. General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th
Cir. 1964); Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company, 207
F. Supp. 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). It should be noted, of course, that the cases
cited in note 56, supra, indicate that Justice Department consent is not a pre-
requisite to the acceptance by the court of a nolo contendere plea.
67. 1962 CCH Trade Cases, Para. 70,552 at p. 77,225 (N.D. Calif. 1962).
68. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 372-73 (D. Minn.
1939), affirmed on other i~sues 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314
U.S. 644 (1941).
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fore constitute 'consent judgments. .. These characteristics
are also typical of guilty pleas in antitrust cases, and con-
sequently it seems that Congress intended both types of
pleas to be included within the proviso of Section 5(a).69
(Emphasis added)
The argument was answered in a different way by Judge Robson in
Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company: "While it is unusual to call a guilty plea a 'consent' to a
judgment, viewed in context, it can not be said to be inappropriate." 7 0
The traditional distinction between nolo contendere and guilty pleas
at common law has furnished the basis of another line of argument.
The essence of that distinction is that the effect of a nolo plea always
has been limited to the particular prosecution in which it is entered,
whereas a guilty plea generally has been admissible in other actions,
at common law, as an admission against interest. 7 1 Some courts have
regarded such distinctions as a persuasive reason for holding guilty
pleas within the scope of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, while
excluding nolo contendere pleas therefrom. 72 Moreover, the common
law principles under which nolo pleas provide no collateral estoppel
or admissible evidence in later cases have been cited by others as
reasons for construing section 5(a) as inapplicable to them. 7 3 Con-
trary arguments on this point would be that the common law distinc-
tion has no logically necessary relationship to this special statutory
provision and that the very fact that guilty pleas ordinarily are
admissible in evidence at common law substantially diminishes the
policy appeal of a determination that section 5(a) applies.
69. 32 F.R.D. 204, 207 (S.D. Calif. 1963), reversed sub nom, City of Burbank
v. General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).
70. 211 F. Supp. 712, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
71. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926) (dictum);
Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Air Reduction Company, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United States v. Standard Ultramarine &
Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Jones, 119
F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (S.D. Calif. 1954). See also the discussion in Part IV, infra.
72. E.g., Atlantic City Electric Company v. General Electric Company,
207 F. Supp. 620, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
73. Barnsdall Refining Corporation v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp.
308, 312 (E.D. Wisc. 1940); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
366, 378 (D. Minn. 1939), affirmed on other issues 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied 314 U.S. 644 (1941). Cf., Simco Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v.
Air Reduction Company, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (references to
consent decree struck); Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D.
Ky. 1942) (references to consent decree and stipulation of facts held inad-
missible).
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In the Burbank opinion, 7 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
included a rather unusual line of argument to the effect (1) that some
defendants plead guilty because they know they are guilty, and others
plead guilty because they believe the Government can prove the
allegations of the indictments, and (2) that neither group should
be treated better than defendants which honestly believe they are
innocent but are found guilty in a trial of their causes. Another
circumstance which apparently has influenced some of the courts
to the disadvantage of defendants on this point is the fact that
criminal defendants have argued so energetically in the criminal
proceedings for the acceptance of nolo contendere rather than of
guilty pleas. For example, the following observation was made in
the City of Burbank case:
. . . we think it curious that antitrust lawyers who will and
have spent hours in urging district court judges that their
clients should be permitted to plead nolo contendere rather
than guilty to antitrust government charges, because of the
differing effect of the two pleas, should now urge there really
is not and should not be any different consequences. . . .75
Whatever may be the merit of the ultimate conclusion reached as
to the status of guilty pleas under section 5(a), this last group of
contentions certainly must be viewed as unrealistic and unfair. Many
factors in addition to the prospects of conviction or acquittal are
considered by defendants in deciding whether to fight or to capitu-
late when indicted for a violation of the antitrust law.7 6 Moreover,
the insistence of defendants upon pleading nolo contendere rather
than guilty reflects no more than the customary caution and a recog-
nition that the status of nolo pleas has been more firmly established
under the authorities than has that of guilty pleas. 77
B. Evaluation:
The recent line of decisions in the Electrical Cases, to the effect that
judgments entered on guilty pleas are within the scope of section 5
(a), provides a graphic illustration of the principle that bad facts
make bad law. The conclusion is inescapable that the rulings of the
74. City of Burbank v. General Electric Company, 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th
Cir. 1964).
75. Ibid.
76. For illustrations, see the reasons cited by counsel for the electrical
equipment manufacturers at the time of the entry of pleas in response to the
Philadelphia indictments, note 115 infra.
77. See United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp.
167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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courts on this point have been influenced materially by the same feel-
ings of moral indignation against the defendants as previously had
been manifested by the Justice Department. 7 8 These decisions have
rested, in reality, upon the view that the objective of assisting al-
legedly injured purchasers of electrical equipment is paramount to
that of encouraging capitulation. 7 9 Such other reasons as have been
cited have been essentially unpersuasive or irrelevant.
If it were possible to consider the matter as a question of first im-
pression, the stronger arguments clearly would favor the position
that guilty pleas, as well as nolo contendere pleas, are beyond the
scope of section 5 (a). In particular, the legislative history, far from
being inconclusive, shows with unusual clarity a specific congressional
intent that the proviso should cover afl criminal pleas entered without
the necessity of a trial.8 0 As a matter of logic, of proper statutory
construction, and of fairly balancing the conflicting interests involved,
therefore, the courts should adopt the view that judgments entered on
guilty pleas are "consent judgments" excluded by the proviso of sec-
tion 5 (a) of the Clayton Act. 8 1 Guilty pleas should not be accorded
prima facie significance in subsequent private actions, even though
they might be admissible therein under ordinary rules of evidence.
IV. EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF GUILTY PLEAS
Assuming that a judgment entered on a guilty plea in a criminal anti-
trust action is within the scope of section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act and
is not excluded by the proviso of that section, it is necessary to deter-
mine what evidentiary effect such a judgment should have in a subse-
quent treble damage action. On this point, section 5 (a) states that
the "final judgment" in the prior criminal proceeding "shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant.., as to all matters respecting
78. See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Judge Connally in General Electric
Company v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
79. In the light of the legislative history of the provision, the attitude
manifested by the courts in these cases is subject to the same criticism which
Chief Judge Tehan made of the Justice Department's policy of refusing to agree
to a consent decree in United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company,
203 F. Supp. 657, 661 (E.D. Wisc. 1962):
In our opinion, this policy is an unauthorized attempt on the part of
an administrative agency to avoid congressional Intent as clearly set
forth in the proviso in §5 of the Clayton Act.
80. See, e.g., the opinion of Circuit Judge Knoch, dissenting in Common-
wealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing, 323 F.2d 412, 417
(7th Cir. 1963).
81. Supra note 78.
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which said judgment ... would be an estoppel as between" the Gov-
ernment and the defendant. Thus, this portion of section 5 (a) has
three elements to it: (1) the final judgment from the criminal pro-
ceeding is the evidence which may be used against the defendant,
and (2) it constitutes prima facie evidence (3) as to all matters for
which it would be an estoppel as between the Government and the de-
fendant.
A. General Principles
There should be no dispute regarding the weight to be given to evi-
dence introduced under section 5 (a). This section very clearly states
that it is prima facie evidence, and the meaning of this is clear in the
law. It is evidence which alone is sufficient to establish the fact for
which it is offered, although it is not conclusive evidence of such fact
but may be rebutted.8 2
The most difficult element of section 5 (a) to apply is with regard to
the issues in the treble damage action as to which the judgment in
the prior criminal proceeding is prima facie evidence. As noted pre-
viously, section 5(a) defines this element as being "all matters re-
specting which said judgment . . . would be an estoppel as between"
the Government and the defendant.
The Supreme Court has confirmed what is obvious from this word-
ing, that the general test is one of collateral estoppel. In Emich Mo-
tors v. General Motors,8 3 a treble damage action, the Supreme Court
wrestled with the question of the evidentiary effect under section 5
(a) of a prior conviction for violation of the Sherman Act based on a
general jury verdict. The Court concluded that such evidentiary effect
"is thus to be determined by reference to the general doctrine of
estoppel." 8 4 The Court then proceeded to define "estoppel" in accord-
82. See, e.g., WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940); Richfield Oil Corp.
v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 961 (1960);
Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied 347 U.S. 976 (1954); Dal International Trading Co. v. The S.S. Milton
J. Forman, 171 F. Supp. 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). In Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civil No. 30015, E.D. Pa., 1964, one of the treble
damage actions in the Electrical Cases, the jury was instructed regarding the
meaning of prima facie evidence as follows:
Prima facie evidence is that evidence which in and of itself is
sufficient to establish the facts alleged. It may be rebutted by other
evidence but it remains throughout the case and would be sufficient in
itself without other evidence to prove the facts. . . . Record p. 7705.
83. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
84. Id. at 568.
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ance with its generally accepted meaning,8 5 i.e., that only matters
which have actually been determined in a prior proceeding are con-
clusive between the parties:
Such estoppel extends only to questions 'distinctly put in
issue and directly determined' in the criminal prosecution.
•.. In the case of a criminal conviction based on a jury ver-
dict of guilty, issues which were essential to the verdict
must be regarded as having been determined by the judg-
ment .... Accordingly, we think plaintiffs are entitled to
introduce the prior judgment to establish prima facie all
matters of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction
and the verdict on which it was based. 86
Thus, the matters on which a final judgment in the criminal pro-
ceeding constitutes prima facie evidence are the same matters which
would be covered by the principle of collateral estoppel if the subse-
quent proceeding were between the Government and the defendant.
The importance of determining the extent to which a final judg-
ment based on a guilty plea in a Sherman Act prosecution prima facie
evidence in a subsequent treble damage action may be seen from the
detailed and comprehensive nature of the indictments in the Electri-
cal Cases. The indictments were essentially the same in form, but for
purposes of illustration the indictment covering power switchgear
assemblies is considered.8 7 Paragraph 14 alleges that "beginning at
least as early as 1958 and continuing thereafter at least to September
23, 1959," the defendants had engaged in a "combination and con-
spiracy in unreasonable restraint of the aforesaid interstate trade
85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942):
(1) Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determina-
tion is conclusive between the parties in a subesquent action on a differ-
ent cause of action ...
(2) A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a sub-
sequent action on a different cause of action as to questions of fact not
actually litigated and determined in the first action.
This is to be distinguished from res judicata under which matters that might
have been but were not litigated between the parties in a prior action are con-
clusive in a subsequent proceeding based on the same cause of action. Id., com-
ment a.
86. Supra note 83 at 569. The common law principle of collateral estoppel
applies only between the same parties and it has applicability in a treble damage
action in which one of the parties, the plaintiff, was not involved in the prior
criminal proceeding only because of the specific provision in section 5(a) of
the Clayton Act.
87. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Criminal Action No.
20399, E. D. Pa., filed June 22, 1960.
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and commerce in power switchgear assemblies, in violation of Section
1 of the ... Sherman Act." Paragraph 15 then alleges that this "com-
bination and conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, under-
standing and concert of action among the defendants .. .the sub-
stantial terms of which were" to fix and maintain prices, to allocate
sales to governmental agencies, to submit rigged bids to governmen-
tal agencies and electric utility companies, and to restrain from sell-
ing certain types of power switchgear assemblies to other manufac-
turers of electrical equipment. Paragraph 16 sets forth many detailed
acts alleged to have been done "for the purpose of forming and
effectuating the aforesaid combination and conspiracy," including
dates and places of alleged meetings among the defendants.88 Para-
88. The following is the full text of paragraph 16 of this power switchgear
assemblies indictment:
During the period of time covered by this indictment, the defendants,
co-conspirators and other persons to the grand jurors unknown, for the
purpose of forming and effectuating the aforesaid combination and con-
spiracy, did among other things, the following:
(a) On or about October 8, 1958, following previous discussions, repre-
sentatives of defendant corporations (other than defendant Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Company) met at the Hotel Astor in New
York City to discuss increasing the price levels for power switch-
gear assemblies.
(b) On or about November 9, 1958, a meeting was held at the Traymore
Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey, at which representatives of all of
the defendant corporations agreed, among other things, that:
(1) In the sale of power switchgear assemblies to electric utility
companies, private industrial corporations, and contractors, all
of the defendant corporations, except Federal Pacific Electric
Company. would sell power switchgear assemblies at "list" or
"book" price levels;
(2) In the sale of power switchgear assemblies to electric utility
companies, private industrial corporations, and contractors,
(except low voltage drawout metal-enclosed switchgear as-
semblies sold to private industrial corporations) defendant
Federal Pacific Electric Company would be permitted to quote
prices at a specified differential below the prices quoted by the
other defendant corporations;
(3) Representatives of all of the defendant corporations would meet
periodically and allocate bids to Federal, State, and local gov-
ernmental agencies according to the following approximate
percentage shares:
General Electric Company 39 per cent
Westinghouse Electric Company 35 per cent
I-T-E Circuit Breaker Company 11 per cent
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company 8 per cent
Federal Pacific Electric Company 7 per cent
(c) On or about November 14, 1958, at New York, New York, another
meeting was held for the purpose of establishing a systematic pro-
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graph 17 then alleges the "effects of the aforesaid combination and
conspiracy" to be that prices of power switchgear assemblies had. been
cedure for carrying out the agreements reached at the November 9,
1958 meeting. At this and subsequent meetings, the defendant cor-
porations agreed that the General Electric Company price lists would
be the "book" or "list" prices for power switchgear assemblies. At
this meeting they also agreed that metal-clad switchgear assemblies
would not be sold to switchboard assemblers;
(d) Following the November 14, 1958 meeting, a series of periodic
meetings were held throughout the United States attended by repre-
sentatives of all of the defendant corporations. At least 25 such
meetings were held between the middle of November 1958 and
October 1959 at various cities, including:
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania







Cherry Hill, New Jersey
(e) At these periodic meetings, a scheme or formula for quoting
nearly identical prices to electric utility companies, private indus-
trial corporations, and contractors was used by defendant corpora-
tions, designated by their representatives as a "phase of the moon"
or "light of the moon" formula. Through cyclic rotating positioning
inherent in the formula one defendant corporation would quote the
price, others would quote intermediate prices and another would
quote the high price; these positions would be periodically rotated
among the defendant corporations. This formula was so calculated
that in submitting prices to these customers, the price spread be-
tween defendant corporations' quotations would be sufficiently nar-
row so as to eliminate actual price competition among them, but
sufficiently wide so as to give an appearance of competition. This
formula was designed to permit each defendant corporation to know
the exact price it and every other defendant. corporation would
quote on each prospective sale;
(f). At these periodic meetings, a cumulative list of sealed bid business
secured by all of the defendant corporations was also circulated
and the representatives present would compare the relative standing
of each corporation according to its agreed upon percentage of the
total sales pursuant to sealed bids. The representatives present
would then discuss particular future bid invitations and designate
which defendant corporation should submit the lowest bid therefor,
the amount of such bid, and the amount of the bid to be submitted
by others;
(g) In connection with the meetings and understandings described above,
precautionary measures were adopted by representatives of defend-
ant corporations to avoid detection, such as minimizing telephone
calls, avoiding leaving notepapers in hotel rooms where meetings
19%5]
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fixed, that competition in the sale of power switchgear assemblies
had been suppressed, and that purchasers of power switchgear as-
semblies had been deprived of the benefits of free competition.8 9
There were five corporate defendants named in the power switch-
gear assemblies indictment and each of them entered a plea of guilty
to the indictment. Similar pleas were entered to some of the indict-
ments covering other products. On the point of the present discussion,
the problem is to determine the evidentiary effect of such guilty pleas
in subsequent treble damage actions in terms of the indictments to
which such guilty pleas were entered. In other words, section 5 (a) of
the Clayton Act states that the final judgment in the criminal pro-
ceeding shall constitute prima facie evidence with regard to matters
for which there would be an estoppel between the Government and
the defendant; but what are those matters? What matters out of a
detailed and comprehensive indictment, such as the indictments in
the Electrical Cases, are subject to the principle of collateral estop-
pel when the final judgment arising from that indictment was based
on a guilty plea?
Even since the advent of the Electrical Cases, there does not appear
to have been any reported decision in which this exact point has been
considered. There are, nevertheless, some guidelines that may be con-
sidered. Foremost among these is the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Emich Motors v. General Motors90 which was re-
ferred to previously. This was a treble damage action brought by a
former General Motors dealer who alleged that his franchise had been
cancelled pursuant to a conspiracy between General Motors Corpora-
tion and General Motors Acceptance Corporation and that the defend-
ants had been convicted of the same conspiracy in a prior Sherman
Act criminal proceeding. In the criminal case, the jury had returned
a general verdict finding both corporate defendants guilty under an
indictment which had charged the defendants with a conspiracy to
force GM dealers to use GMAC financing on the sale of automobiles.
were held and avoiding contacts among such representatives in the
hotels where meetings were being held. In addition, code numbers
identifying defendant corporations were used in documents effectu-
ating the "phase of the moon" formula referred to above.
(h) Pursuant to these agreements, the defendant corporations submitted
in 1958 and 1959 to various Federal, State and local governmental
agencies and other awarding authorities throughout the United
States.
89. Paragraphs 1 through 13 and paragraph 18, which are not summarized
in the text, are more routine in nature and contain allegations regarding the
product, the defendants, the co-conspirators, the nature of the trade and com-
merce, and jurisdiction and venue.
90. Supra note 83.
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The. indictment was detailed and comprehensive and alleged many
courses of action on the part of the defendants calculated to 'force
the dealers to use GMAC financing.
The issue before the Supreme Court in the treble damage action in
Emich Motors was the evidentiary use which could be made, under
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, of the prior criminal judgment.
After stating the principle that the doctrine of estoppel was the
general rule to be applied and, accordingly, that the prior judgment
was prima facie evidence of "all matters of fact and law necessarily
decided by the conviction and the verdict on which it was based," the
Court then continued:
The difficult problem, of course, is to determine what
.matters were adjudicated in the antecedent suit. A general
verdict of the jury or judgment of the court without special
findings does not indicate which of the means charged in
the indictment were found to have been used in effectuating
the conspiracy. And since all of the acts charged need not be
proved for conviction, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), such a verdict does not establish
that defendants used all of the means charged or any partic-
ular one. Under these circumstances what was decided by
the criminal judgment must be determined by the trial
judge hearing the treble-damage suit, upon an examination
of the record, including the pleadings, the evidence sub-
mitted, the instructions under which the jury arrived at its
verdict, and any opinions of the courts. 9 1
The Court of Appeals in Emich Motors had held that the prior
criminal judgment was prima facie evidence only of the fact of a con-
spiracy by the defendants to restrain interstate trade and commerce
in General Motors automobiles for the purpose of monopolizing the
financing of those automobiles. 9 2 The Supreme Court went further
and held that the criminal judgment was prima facie evidence not
only of this general conspiracy, but "also of its effectuation by coerc-
ing General Motors dealers to use GMAC." 9 3 The Supreme Court
based this conclusion on statements in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in the criminal proceeding that the jury had determined that
the defendants employed coercive acts against its dealers. 9 4
91. Supra note 83 at 569...
92. 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950).
93. Supra note 83 at 570-71.
94. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
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When the judgment in a Sherman Act conspiracy case is based on
a guilty plea it is difficult to see how the judgment could be prima
facie evidence of anything more than the general conspiracy charged
in the indictment, which would be the same evidentiary effect as de-
termined by the Court of Appeals in Emich Motors for a judgment
based on a general jury verdict. In such a case, there are no plead-
ings, other than the indictment, and no evidence, instructions or opin-
ion upon which the trial judge in the treble damage action may de-
termine a greater evidentiary effect, as the Supreme Court did in
Emich Motors. All that the trial judge has for guidance are the
indictment, the general plea of guilty and the judgment. Consequently,
only the general fact of a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act
logically can be said to have been determined by a guilty plea. Ac-
cordingly, this should be the extent of the facts for which the judg-
ment constitutes prima facie evidence. 95
Another useful guideline in considering the evidentiary effect of
guilty pleas under section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act may be found in a
series of Government civil cases which have considered, under the
common law rule of collateral estoppel, the issues determined by a
prior criminal judgment based on a guilty plea to an indictment un-
der the False Claims Act. 9 6 The courts in these cases have been con-
95. Cases subsequent to Emich Motors have taken a rather restrictive view
of the evidentiary effect to be derived from section 5(a). In Monticello Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 197 F.2d 629, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1952), a treble damage
action following a criminal proceeding under the Sherman Act in which the
jury returned a guilty verdict, the court stated:
. . . whatever is crucial to the treble-damage case and is not distinctly
determined in the previous government suit must be proven by direct
evidence .... Section 5 does not permit a haphazard use of a criminal
judgment merely for its aura of guilt, or 'to imply new wrongdoing
from past wrongdoing.'
In Eagle Lion Studios v. Loew's Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1957), a treble
damage action following a civil trial in which the government obtained injunctive
relief against violations of the Sherman Act, the court stated:
In determining, under that section, the effect of a judgment in a prior
anti-trust suit it is not our function to consider inferences, whether
reasonable ones or not, that might be drawn from the language of the
prior judgment. Under section 5 a judgment in a prior suit is prima
facie evidence 'as to all matters respecting which said judgment * * *
would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto * * *' (Emphasis
added.) Thus, in construing a prior judgment for purposes of this statute
the court in the subsequent action does not sit as a trier of fact, i.e.,
it does not have wide license to draw inferences from the judgment and
record in the prior litigation. Rather, the court is circumscribed by the
relatively narrow limits of the doctrine of estoppel.
96. United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v.
Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1955); United States v.
American Packing Co., 113 F. Supp. 223 (D.N.J. 1953).
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sistent in holding that as a result of the criminal judgment based on
a guilty plea the defendant is estopped from denying the fact of the
conspiracy in its essential terms and the defendant's participation
therein, but that the defendant is not estopped from denying partic-
ular overt acts alleged in the indictment. This is stated fully in
United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., for example, as follows:
It is well settled that a conviction based on a verdict set-
tles all issues 'essential to the verdict'. Emich Motors, supra
[340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 414]. But since in a criminal con-
spiracy case proof of the unlawful agreement between the
parties, plus the commission of any overt act, not necessarily
all those alleged, suffices to support a verdict of guilty, no
conviction of a criminal conspiracy, whether on verdict or
plea, suffices of itself, without further evidence, to prove
that defendant either admitted, or was found guilty by the
jury, of committing any particular overt act. Nor, if the
conspiracy is alleged to have been effectuated, as in Emich
Motors, by a number of means, each of which would have
sufficed therefor, can it be determined on a plea of guilty
to such count, which of such means were admitted by the
defendant to have been adopted for that purpose. Emich
Motors, supra. All that such plea admits is 'the existence of
the consuiracy as charged * * * as well as participation
therein by the defendants so pleading.' United States v.
American Packing Co., supra [113 F.Supp. 225]. But, of
course, the conspiracy as charged means the admission of
that particular conspiracy in its essential nature, else the
pleading defendants could not later plead double jeopardy
to another indictment of that same nature. 9 7
Another area of law to be considered on this point is the use of a
prior guilty plea as a common law admission in a civil action. Even
aside from section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, a plea of guilty to a
Sherman Act indictment probably would be admissible in the subse-
quent treble damage action as an "admission" under the common law
97. 127 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.N.J. 1955).
Contrary to the statement in Ben Grunstein, the conspiracy or agreement alone
is sufficient for a criminal offense under the Sherman Act and it is not necessary
that there be any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 (1940); Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373, 378 (1913); United States v. Gasoline Retailers Assn. Inc., 285 F.2d
688, 691 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 1943).
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rules of evidence. 98 Similar to the effect given by section 5(a), the
use of a guilty plea as an admission has the status of prima facie
evidence, i.e., it is not conclusive on the fact for which it is used, but,
if not rebutted, it is sufficient to establish the fact.9 9 It also would
appear that the general principle governing evidentiary effect is the
same whether a plea of guilty is used as a common law admission or
whether a final judgment based on a guilty plea is used under sec-
tion 5(a). For example, in Corpus Juris Secundum, it is stated that
a plea of guilty to a charge of criminal conspiracy admits only the
existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation therein
and does not constitute an admission of the various alleged deeds
done as part of the conspiracy.' 0 0 Thus, the law relating to the use
of a prior guilty plea as an "admission" in a civil action lends fur-
ther support to the conclusion that a minimum evidentiary effect
should be given under section 5 (a) to a judgment based on a guilty
plea.
Referring again to the indictment in the Electrical Cases covering
power switchgear assemblies, it would seem clear under the general
principles set forth in Emich Motors and in cases such as Ben Grun-
stein that the alleged effects of the conspiracy as set forth in para-
graph 17 of that indictment were not determined by the guilty pleas
and, therefore, would not be within the matters for which the judg-
ment is prima facie evidence in the treble damage actions. These
allegations could in no sense be considered, in the words of Emich
Motors, as "necessarily decided" by, or "essential" to, the charge of
98. See, e.g., Dunham v. Pannell, 263 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v.
Kurtz, 34 Pa. D.&C. 439 (C.P. Bucks Co. 1938); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951).
In Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505,
507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963), a civil antitrust action, one of the defendants moved to
strike from the complaint all references to a guilty plea which the defendant had
entered in an earlier criminal contempt proceeding instituted for violation of a
prior consent decree. In refusing to grant the defendant's motion, the court
stated:
Whether or not the guilty plea is admissible under § 5 as prima facie
evidence, it may, depending on the terms of the consent decree and the
violations thereof alleged in the citation for contempt, be admissible
under common law rules of evidence as an admission against interest.
Nevertheless, a logical argument might be advanced on behalf of defendants to
the effect that section 5(a) should be construed to have superseded the common
law principle of admissibility entirely, on the ground that the policy of encourag-
ing capitulation cannot fully be effectuated so long as defendants feel that
guilty pleas might be utilized against them in later actions, either under section
5(a) or as common law admissions.
99. Bruce v. McClure, 220 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1955); Greenfield v. Tuccilo,
129 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1055 (3d ed. 1940).
100. 22 C.J.S. 0riminal Law §424(3) (1961).
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a Sherman Act violation and the guilty pleas to that charge. Like-
wise, the detailed facts regarding the conspiracy, as alleged in para-
graph 16 of the power switchgear assemblies indictment certainly
are not matters for which the judgment is prima facie evidence. The
allegations in neither of these paragraphs concerned essential ele-
ments of the Government's criminal case. This leaves paragraphs 14
and 15 to be considered.
Paragraph 14 of the power switchgear assemblies alleged that dur-
ing a certain period of time the defendants had engaged in a con-
spiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in power switchgear as-
semblies in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Paragraph 15
alleged that this conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement,
understanding and concert of action among the defendants to fix
prices, to allocate sales to governmental agencies and to submit
rigged bids to governmental agencies and electric utility companies.
On the one hand it could be argued that the allegations of paragraph
15 are not a matter of prima facie evidence since proof of the con-
spiracy alone, as alleged in paragraph 14, would have been sufficient
for conviction if the criminal case had gone to trial.1 0 1 On the other
hand, it could be argued that the allegations of paragraph 15 are a
matter of prima facie evidence because they are necessary in order
to constitute the "conspiracy in its essential nature." 10 2 It could also
be argued that even paragraph 14 is too broad to constitute prima
facie evidence in its entirety for the reason that it alleges a conspiracy
"beginning at least as early as 1958 and continuing thereafter at least
to September 23, 1959," whereas in the criminal action it would not
have been necessary for the Government to have proved that the con-
spiracy continued for the entire period charged in the indictment.' 0 3
The foregoing comments thus indicate the nature of the task fac-
ing a trial judge in a treble damage action when the judgment from a
prior criminal antitrust proceeding based on a guilty plea is offered
in evidence. The determination of these matters is largely dependent
upon the form and wording of the indictment, but it would seem in
all cases that the trial judge should take a conservative or restrictive
approach to these matters in the interests of fair play and due proc-
ess. As stated in United States v. American Packing Corp.:
101. See note 97, supra.
102. United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907, 910
(D.N.J. 1955).
103 "Since the agreement itself constituted the offense, the additional al-
legation in the indictment that the conspiracy was 'continuing' did not set forth
an essential element of the crime." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
260 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1958), af'd 360 U.S. 395 (1959). See also Cooper v.
United States, 91 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1937).
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In matters affecting criminality, not only statutes but also
pleas of guilty must be construed strictly and must be
limited to the narrowest confines consistent with an intelli-
gent interpretation of the effect thereof. 1 0 4
B. Application in Electrical Cases
With the practical problems in mind as discussed above, considera-
tion is now given to the actual evidentiary use of the guilty pleas
permitted by the trial judges in the four treble damage actions in the
Electrical Cases in which trials have been concluded. 1 0 5
In the first of these cases to be tried, Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. in the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, 1 0 6 Judge Joseph S. Lord, III permitted the plaintiffs to read to
the jury only the paragraph of the power transformer indictment
which is comparable to paragraph 14 of the power switchgear assem-
blies indictment, that being the paragraph which alleged that during
a certain period of time the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy
in unreasonable restraint of trade in power transformers in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Judge informed the jury at that
point in the trial that the defendants had entered pleas of guilty to
the indictment and he then gave a summary instruction as to the
effect thereof as prima facie evidence.' 0  In his closing instructions
to the jury, Judge Lord read the same paragraph and instructed the
jury that "the defendants pleaded guilty to that indictment and I
charge you that that plea of guilty is prima facie evidence that the
defendants did at some time at least between 1956 and 1960 conspire
to violate the Antitrust Act in respect to power transformers."' 0 s
Thus, Judge Lord allowed the use of only the one basic paragraph of
the indictment and did not permit any use to be made even of the
next succeeding paragraph containing the allegations that the con-
spiracy was to fix prices and allocate sales.
Even with the admission in evidence of only this basic paragraph,
there remains the question of properly charging the jury as to when
the conspiracy existed. The paragraph from the power transformer
104 113 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.N.J. 1953).
105 See note 3, supra.
106. Civil No. 30015, E.D. Pa., 1964.
107. The practice of giving a preliminary instruction to the jury at this
point in the trial was recognized and approved by the Supreme Court in Emich
Motors.
•108. For the full text of Judge Lord's charge to the jury, see 1964 CCH
Trade Cases, Para. 71,123.
[Vol. 3:.P. 167
USE OF CRIMINAL PLEAS
indictment, for example, alleged that the conspiracy was during the
period "beginning at least as early as 1956 . . . and continuing there-
after up to and including the date of the return of the indictment."
In charging the jury in a treble damage action, there are three pos-
sible approaches available to the judge with regard to the time ele-
ment. He could charge to the effect (1) that there was a conspiracy
and that it existed at least between 1956 and 1960 (thus, implying
that the effect of the judgment might extend even prior to 1956), or
(2) that there was a conspiracy between 1956 and 1960, or (3) that
there was a conspiracy at some time between 1956 and 1960.
The first approach clearly would be erroneous. The fact of a con-
spiracy prior to 1956 is certainly not an "essential" element of a
judgment based on a guilty plea to this indictment and no implication
of such fact should be given to the jury. The defendants in the Phila-
delphia Electric case argued that this implication was in fact given
when Judge Lord instructed the jury that the prima facie evidence
was that the defendants conspired 'at some time at least between
1956 and 1960." 1 09 Although it is possible that this instruction was
ambiguous and could have given this implication, it is clear that
Judge Lord did not feel that the criminal judgments constituted any
evidence of a conspiracy prior to 1956. He expressly stated in his
charge that "it is not evidence of any conspiracy before 1956."
A more likely area for debate is between the second and third ap-
proaches to the question of when the conspiracy existed, i.e., "be-
tween 1956 and 1960", or "at some time between 1956 and 1960." It
is not clear which of these two views was taken by Judge Lord in the
Philadelphia Electric case. The latter possibly was intended when
Judge Lord instructed the jury that the defendants conspired "at
some time at least between 1956 and 1960." A few moments later,
however, the Judge stated to the jury that the prima facie evidence
was "for the years involved in that plea; namely, at least from 1956
109. The defendants argued that this instruction was to the effect that the
defendants conspired "at some time, at least between 1956 and 1960." In reading
the charge in print, it seems to be a matter of where a comma belongs. As stated
in the next succeeding paragraph in the text, it is possible that Judge Lord
intended the meaning to be that the defendants conspired "at some time, at least,
between 1956 and 1960" or, more simply, "at some time between 1956 and 1960."
The correct interpretation cannot be made without having heard the Judge speak
the words, and it is doubtful whether reliance can be placed upon a proper use of
commas by the court reporter. The issue could be avoided in future cases by
eliminating the words "at least" and simply charging that the defendants con-
spired "at some time between 1956 and 1960." This would eliminate both an
inference of a conspiracy prior to 1956 and an inference of a conspiracy during
the entire period from 1956 to 1960.
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to 1960.' 110 Under the rule given by the Supreme Court in Emich
Motors that only "issues which were essential to the verdict" must be
regarded as having been determined by the criminal judgment, it is
difficult to see how the prima facie evidence can be broader than the
fact that the conspiracy existed at some time between 1956 and 1960.
Because the simple act of entering into a conspiracy constitutes a
criminal violation under the Sherman Act, it would not have been
necessary for the Government to have proved that the conspiracy
continued for the entire period charged in the indictment, but only
that the conspiracy existed at some time during the period. If the
criminal case had actually gone to trial so that the judge in a subse-
quent treble damage action would have had available a record from
which he could determine that the Government's proof pointed toward
a conspiracy existing throughout the entire period, then it might be
proper to conclude that the continuation of the conspiracy during the
entire period necessarily was determined by the jury verdict. But
when the judgment is based on a guilty plea, the judge does not have
such extrinsic aids. The only basis upon which he can make a deter-
mination of the evidentiary effect of the judgment is an analysis of
the essential elements of the criminal offense as contained in the
indictment. It would seem to be an inescapable conclusion, therefore,
that the prima facie evidence extends only to the fact that the con-
spiracy existed at some time during the period alleged in the indict-
ment, and not that it existed during the entire period.
In N.W. Electric Power Cooperative v. Moloney Electric Co. in the
Western District of Missouri, Western Division,1 11 another of the
treble damage trials in the Electrical Cases, Judge William H. Becker
did not allow the plaintiffs to make any reference to the power thans-
former indictment and guilty pleas in their opening statements to
the jury. The defendants had objected that no useful purpose would
be served thereby since the defendants had admitted in a Pretrial
Report in this case that a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act
had existed for a period of time even longer than the period charged
in the indictment. Later during the trial Judge Becker ruled that the
prior judgments of conviction and the indictment and guilty pleas
were inadmissible in evidence. Judge Becker gave his ruling as
follows:
In the interest of a fair and even administration of justice,
I have come tentatively to the conclusion that, first, in view
110. In his initial instruction, at the time the plaintiffs read this paragraph
to the jury, Judge Lord had made a similar statement: ". . . it is proof only of
the existence of the conspiracy during the period charged in the indictment;
namely, from 1956 to 1960." Record p. 176.
111. Civil No. 13290-3, W.D. Mo., W. Div., 1964.
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of the belated admission of conspiracy, that the judgment
of conviction ought not to be admitted in evidence because
it is of lesser force than the admission, both in breadth of
time and in its effect ...
Now, the pleas of guilty in respect to the indictment
create a different situation. And I am not certain that I
am right about this because of the lack of authority in the
form of judicial opinion at a higher level. But I am going
to say, first, that unless I am shown some authority which
indicates that the plea of guilty to the indictment does more
than admit the minimum facts necessary to constitute the
offense, I am not going to admit the pleas of guilty, and the
portions of the indictment to which they relate. The reason
is, that I have tentatively decided that the plea of guilty
does not admit anything more than the commission of an
offense and the commission of acts, the minimum acts which
would be necessary to constitute an offense. The offense
is already admitted.
Second, that if I should be wrong on this, and independ-
ently, that I feel that the possible misuse of this by the jury,
so greatly overweighs any probative effect that it might have
that it ought not to be submitted to the jury.
... . And there are two reasons besides technical evi-
dence reasons that I am making this tentative ruling.
The first one is, that I want to encourage people in these
case [sic] to make admissions even if they are belated ad-
missions. And the second one is, that to serve the policy
of the antitrust laws, I want to encourage the entry of pleas
of guilty in criminal cases without a consideration by the
defendant of the effects of that plea in civil cases other then
[sic] the prima facie showing which is provided for by
statute. 112
Consistent with his exclusion of references to and evidence of the
prior convictions, Judge Becker did not mention the prior criminal
case in his final charge to the jury. Instead, he told the jury that
in the Pretrial Report the defendants had admitted a conspiracy In
the years 1951 to 1959 and had denied a conspiracy prior to 1951.113
112. Record pp. 2764-65.
113. Record p. 8598. For the full text of Judge Becker's charge to the jury,
see Record pp. 8585-647.
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Because of the admission by the defendants of the conspiracy dur-
ing a period of time greater than the period charged in the indictment,
Judge Becker did not have to make an actual choice regarding the
admissibility of the various paragraphs of the -indictment, but it is
clear that he would not have gone any further than Judge Lord did
in the Philadelphia Electric trial, i.e., the admission in evidence of
the basic paragraph of the indictment in which the general allegation
of the conspiracy is contained. It cannot be determined definitely
from the record in the N.W. Electric case whether Judge Becker, if
he had charged the jury in terms of the indictment, would have
included the entire period alleged in the indictment within the scope
of prima facie evidence, or whether he would have instructed that
the prior judgment was prima facie evidence only of a conspiracy at
some time during the period. It is noteworthy, however, that Judge
Becker felt that "the plea of guilty does not admit anything more
than the commission of an offense and the commission of . . . the
minimum acts which would be necessary to constitute an offense."
This strongly indicates that Judge Becker would have held the prior
criminal judgments to be prima facie evidence only that a conspiracy
existed at some time during the period alleged in the indictment.
Judge Becker's comments following this point should also be noted
particularly because they demonstrate the correct approach for the
courts to take to this whole question. The jury can make great misuse
of the prior criminal judgment and, for this reason, a trial judge
should be cautious in permitting the indcitment to be read or given
to the jury. Furthermore, as Judge Becker pointed out, defendants
in criminal antitrust cases are going to be very reluctant to enter
guilty pleas unless they feel secure that a minimum use will be
permitted of such pleas as prima facie evidence in subsequent treble
damage actions.
In City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., in the
District Court of the District of Columbia, 1 4 involving steam turbine
generators, the parties had entered into a stipulation as to the per-
tinent facts in the indictments, the guilty pleas, the judgments entered
on those pleas and the statements made by counsel for the defend-
ants in connection with those pleas.' 1 5 The stipulation referred only
114. Civil No. 348-62, D.D.C., 1964.
115. At the time of entry of the guilty pleas, counsel for the corporate de-
fendants made statements similar to the following which was made by counsel
for Westinghouse:
. . . we have assured the Government that Westinghouse will plead
guilty to seven indictments, and have received assurance from the Gov-
ernment that it will not oppose Westinghouse's application to enter pleas
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to the basic paragraph of the turbine indictment and, accordingly,
Judge John J. Sirica in his closing charge to the jury stated that
the stipulation was "some evidence, but not conclusive evidence,
that the defendants did at some time at least between November
of 1955 and June 21, 1960, conspire to violate the antitrust act in
respect to turbine generators."' 1 6 Thus, this case is consistent
with the Philadelphia Electric and N.W. Electric cases in using only
the basic paragraph of the indictment as prima facie evidence and
in not using even the various alleged purposes of the conspiracy as
contained in the next succeeding paragraph. In addition, Judge
Sirica appears to have stated in his charge that the evidence to be
derived from the criminal judgment is that the conspiracy existed
at some time during the period from November, 1955 to June of
1960, and not that it existed during the entire period."17
The only other treble damage action in the Electrical Cases in
which a trial has been concluded at this time is City of San Antonio
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. in the Western District of Texas." S
The claims in this case, which involved steam turbine generators,
were settled after several months of trial and prior to the final charge
to the jury. Nevertheless, the portions from the prior criminal pro-
ceeding which Judge Adrian A. Spears permitted the plaintiffs to
introduce in evidence and the Judge's instruction to the jury at that
point in the trial enables this case to be used for comparison pur-
poses. It may be noted at the outset that Judge Spears went further
in permitting the use of the prior criminal proceeding than was per-
mitted in the other three cases. Plaintiff's counsel was permitted to
of nolo contendere as to those of the remaining thirteen indictments that
are applicable to it.
It has also been agreed by the Government . . . that the related
eighteen civil suits will be disposed of as to Westinghouse by the entry
of ordinary consent decrees ... with no admission of liability by West-
inghouse.
In entering pleas of guilty and nolo contendere prior to the taking
of any testimony, Westinghouse wishes to make it clear that it does
not thereby admit the allegations of any of those indictments but is
simply changing its pleas for the purpose of promptly disposing of the
mass of pending litigation.
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Criminal Action No. 20235 and
related cases (E.D. Pa., Transcript, December 8, 1960, pp. 394-95).
116. Record p. 4684. For full text of Judge Sirica's charge to the jury, see
Record pp. 4651-705.
117. As noted previously in the discussion of the Philadelphia Electric case,
there is a possibility of a different interpretation because of the words "at least"
being used in the instruction.
118. Civil No. 3064, W.D. Tex., 1964.
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read to the jury the following portions of the turbine indictment: the
caption which included not only the names of the corporate defend-
ants but also the individual officers and employees of the corporate de-
fendants who were indicted; the paragraph which defined the product;
the paragraph which described the corporate defendants; the para-
graph which alleged that the acts charged in the indictment were done
by the officers and employees of the corporate defendants, including
the individual defendants, while engaged in the management and con-
trol of the affairs of the corporate defendants; the paragraph which
alleged the nature of the trade and commerce; the paragraph which
alleged that the defendant corporations manufactured and sold a
high percentage of the turbine generator units used in the United
States, the paragraph which alleged the classes of customers for the
product; the paragraph which alleged the volume and interstate
nature of the trade; the paragraph, comparable to paragraph 14 of
the power switchgear assemblies indictment, which alleged a con-
spiracy in the general terms of the statute; and the next succeeding
paragraph, comparable to paragraph 15 of the power switchgear
assemblies indictment, which alleged that the purposes of the con-
spiracy were to fix prices and to submit rigged bids and price quota-
tions to purchasers. 1 19 Judge Spears specifically ruled that the
plaintiffs could not make references to the paragraphs comparable to
paragraphs 16 and 17 of the power switchgear assemblies indictment
in which the detailed facts of the conspiracy and the effect of the
conspiracy were alleged. 20 Plaintiff's counsel then put into evidence
the judgments of conviction which had been entered against the
corporate defendants based on their guilty pleas. Judge Spears im-
mediately thereafter instructed the jury regarding the evidence to be
derived from the prior criminal proceeding. He read to the jury what
119. Record pp. 227-33.
120. Record p. 156. Judge Spears also ruled that the plaintiffs could not
read to the jury what apparently was intended as paragraph 3 of the indictment in
which the individual defendants are indentified by their position or capacity with
the corporate defendants. During the reading of the indictment to the jury, con-
fusion arose as to whether the Judge had ruled out Arabic three or Roman three
of the indictment, Roman three being a major breakdown of the indictment and
containing only the paragraph numbered Arabic five in which corporate co-
conspirators (who were not indicted) are named. The result of the confusion was
that neither paragraph Arabic three nor paragraph Arabic five was read to the
jury. There might very likely be prejudicial error in making reference to the
individual defendants in the criminal case who were not defendants in the civil
action but, as mentioned subsequently in the text, any such error would have al-
ready occurred through the reading of the complete caption of the indictment
which included the names of the individual defendants. Judge Spears also ruled
out of evidence paragraph 14, the concluding paragraph of the indictment, which
alleged jurisdiction and venue for the criminal action in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
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he called the "only parts of the indictment in that case which are at
all pertinent in this case." These were the two paragraphs containing
the general allegation of the conspiracy and the alleged purposes of
the conspiracy. Judge Spears continued by stating that the jury was
to "disregard and not consider for any purpose whatever" any part
of the indictment other than these two paragraphs. He also instructed
the jury that counsel for the corporate defendants, before entering
their pleas of guilty, had announced in open court "that- such pleas
of guilty were being made by them to terminate what would other-
wise be most protracted and expensive litigation."' 12 1 He concluded
by stating that the criminal judgments were prima facie evidence of
the existence of the general conspiracy charged and of the participa-
tion therein by the three corporate defendants. 12 2
Although Judge Spears was consistent with the other three Elec-
trical Cases in not permitting any evidentiary use to be made of the
third and fourth major paragraphs of the indictment in which de-
tailed facts and the effects of the conspiracy are alleged, he did go
further than the other three cases in allowing the second of the
major paragraphs, regarding the alleged terms or purposes of the
conspiracy, to be used in evidence. As mentioned previously in this
discussion, it is difficult to see how even this second of the major
paragraphs would be "essential" to the judgment. This conclusion is
supported even by the portion of Judge Spears' instruction in which
he stated that the "judgments are only prima facie evidence in this
case of the existence of the general conspiracy charged and of the
participation therein" by the defendants. In other words, it would
seem that Judge Spears' instruction correctly stated the general rule
as to the evidentiary effect of the criminal judgments, but that the
admission in evidence of the second of the major paragraphs of the
indictment, alleging the terms or purposes of the conspiracy, is in-
consistent with this general rule in the sense that this paragraph
goes beyond "the general conspiracy charged and of the participation
therein" by the defendants.
In addition to allowing the second of the major paragraphs of the
indictment to be used in evidence, Judge Spears permitted various
portions of the indictment preceding the four major paragraphs to be
read into evidence by plaintiff's counsel. This would appear to be un-
warranted under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Emich Motors since there is nothing "essential" about these allega-
gations insofar as the judgment of conviction is concerned. More
121. See note 115, supra.
122. For the full text of Judge Spears' initial charge to the jury, see Rec-
ord pp. 235-38.
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specifically, there would seem to be error in permitting the plaintiff
to make references to the indicted individuals through the reading
to the jury of the caption of the indictment. There is certainly noth-
ing "essential" in the indentification of these individuals, and it could
be argued that this had a tendency to inflame the jurors against the
defendants.
Considering the rules handed down by the Supreme Court in Emich
Motors, and bearing in mind the possibility of misuse of the indict-
ment by the jury as suggested by Judge Becker in the N.W. Electric
case, it seems clear that the most that should be read to the jury in a
treble damage action from the indictment in a prior criminal proceed-
ing in which the conviction was based on a guilty plea would be the
basic paragraph containing the general allegation of the conspiracy.
This conclusion is supported by the actual results in the Philadelphia
Electric and Burlington cases and by the thoughts expressed by
Judge Becker in the N.W. Electric case.
Even this basic paragraph creates a problem because of the allega-
tion as to the period of time during which the conspiracy existed.
Since the Government in the criminal case in order to obtain a con-
viction would not have had to prove a continuing conspiracy during
the entire period, but only that the conspiracy existed at some time,
the allegation of a conspiracy during the entire period is not "essen-
tial" to the criminal judgment and should not be within the scope
of prima facie evidence in the treble damage action. The prima facie
evidence should be confined to the fact that the conspiracy existed at
some time during the stated period. This is probably what the judges
in the Philadelphia Electric and Burlington cases intended in the
portions of their instructions in which they stated that the criminal
judgments were evidence that the defendants had conspired "at some
time. at least between" the two stated dates. Judge Becker's com-
ments in N.W. Electric indicate that he would have given a similar
instruction on this point.
Even though the judge instructs that the prima facie evidence is
that the conspiracy existed at some time during the period, the jury
could still have in mind the allegation from the indictment that the
conspiracy existed during the entire period. This leads to the ques-
tion of what documents from the criminal proceeding should be ad-
mitted in evidence. As pointed out at the beginning of this discussion,
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act states that the "final judgment" in
the prior criminal proceeding "shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant." This seems clearly to provide that the "final judg-
ment" is to be the evidence, rather than any of the paragraphs from
the indictment. The criminal judgments in the Electrical Cases, for
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example, identified the criminal proceeding, stated that the defendant
had been convicted upon a plea of guilty to the charge of violating
section 1 of the Sherman Act, and stated that the defendant is ad-
judged guilty as convicted. 1 23 This would seem to be all that plain-
tiff's counsel needs in the record of the treble damage action in order
to have the evidentiary benefit of section 5 (a). The trial judge would
then be in a position, according to the principles set forth in Emich
Motors, to examine the indictment and to charge the jury as to the
prima facie evidence which was to be derived from the prior judg-
ment. This would still permit the plaintiff to "protect" his record
while at the same time eliminating the possible prejudice which could
result to the defendant from the admission in evidence of portions
of the indictment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act unquestionably is inapplicable to
criminal judgments entered on nolo contendere pleas. Under the
authority of recent decisions in the Electrical Industry litigation,
however, section 5(a) probably will be held applicable to judgments
entered on guilty pleas, despite the persuasive evidence that Congress
intended both guilty pleas and nolo pleas to be excluded by the pro-
viso. The most important questions yet to be answered in this field
are the very practical ones involving the evidentiary scope and effect
to be accorded by the courts in treble damage actions to judgments
entered on guilty pleas. The general test of the factual issues on which
a criminal judgment can be utilized under section 5 (a) as prima facie
evidence in a subsequent private action is whether such facts were
necessarily decided by, or were essential to, the judgment. When deal-
ing with a judgment entered on a guilty plea, the trial court can look
only to the indictment for the purpose of determining the facts which
were essential to the judgment, and logically the court should limit
123. For example, the judgment against General Electric under the turbine
indictment provided:
Judgment and commitment. United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. United States of America versus Gen-
eral Electric Company, number 20401, on this, the 6th day of February,
1961, came the attorney for the government and the defendant appeared
in person and by counsel. It is adjudged that the defendant has been
convicted upon its plea of guilty of the offense of violation of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, and the Court having asked the defendant
whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced,
and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to The
Court, it is adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and con-
victed.
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the effect of the judgment to the bare factual elements essential to the
criminal offense charged in the indictment. Because of the preju-
dicial effect which the averments ordinarily contained in an anti-
trust indictment might have on the jury in subsequent private action,
the courts should permit in evidence only the judgment entered on a
guilty plea and should prohibit plaintiff's counsel from making any
reference to the contents of the indictment. A practical effect which
decisions permitting plaintiffs to make use of guilty pleas in subse-
quent treble damage actions undoubtedly will have, will be greatly to
increase the incentive of defendants in future criminal antitrust pro-
ceedings to resist the charges made by the Government and to require
the Justice Department to prove its case in a criminal trial, unless
they are permitted to enter nolo contendere pleas rather than guilty
pleas.
